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Consciousness is not a physically provable property
Catherine M Reason1
We present a logical proof that computing machines, and by extension
physical  systems,  can  never  be  certain  if  they  possess  conscious
awareness.  This implies that human consciousness is associated with a
violation of energy conservation.  We examine the significance that a
particular interpretation of quantum mechanics, known as single mind
Q (Barrett  1999),  might  have  for  the  detection  of  such  a  violation.
Finally we apply single mind Q to the problem of free will as it arises in
some celebrated experiments by the neurophysiologist Benjamin Libet.
In 1995 Gilbert Caplain published a paper entitled “Is consciousness a computational 
property?”, in which he outlined an argument to the effect that no computing machine 
could ever be conscious.  In his paper, Caplain pointed out that his argument was 
presented only in outline, and that some of the ideas presented required further work  
(Caplain 1995, 2000).  In this author’s opinion Caplain’s argument is not, in fact, an 
argument that consciousness  is not a computational property but rather something 
more subtle; it is an argument that no computing machine can ever, using purely 
computational processes, be certain if it is conscious. 
To establish his argument, Caplain demonstrates an inconsistency between two 
principles; the principle of reflexivity and the principle of cognitive separation.  
Reflexivity is Caplain’s term for the capacity of conscious beings to know with 
certainty that they are conscious; cognitive separation can be expressed as the 
separation between some symbolic state in a computing machine, and the state of 
affairs which that state represents.  Caplain argues that, if all computing machines are 
bound by the principle of cognitive separation, then the inconsistency between these 
two principles implies that no computing machine can ever be truly conscious, and 
hence conscious human beings cannot be computing machines.  This argument 
effectively applies Descartes’ notion of the malicious genius to the internal states of a 
computing machine.
It seems to this author that Caplain’s use of the term reflexivity does not conform to 
the usual philosophical usage, and so I shall use the term self-certainty instead.  To 
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avoid any ambiguity we shall define this term here:
Definition:  Self-certainty is the capacity of at least some conscious beings to verify 
with certainty that they are conscious.
The detailed proof of Caplain’s result that we are presenting here is substantially 
different from Caplain’s in form, and attempts to minimize any dependence on 
philosophically ambiguous terms such as “knowledge” and “belief”.  However it 
relies on the same properties of consciousness and of machines.  For the purposes of 
this argument, a computational process is operationally defined as any process which 
can be represented in the following form:
     Result = P(input) 
where P is some computation.   The exact form of P itself is irrelevant to this 
argument, so according to this definition a computational process is any computation 
which associates an input to an output.  A computation here means simply any process
which occurs in a computing machine.  If the reader is concerned that this leaves the 
term “computing machine” undefined, then this may be taken to mean “some Turing 
machine”, although this is not in fact a necessary stipulation.
In order to show that no computing machine can verify with certainty that it is 
conscious, one must first assume a computing machine M, all of whose computations 
are assumed to take the form above.  At this point we must also define the following 
Principle F  (the functionalist principle):
“Every human mental process supervenes on some computational process.”
This principle asserts, in effect, that human beings are computing machines of the 
same form as M.  M is now presented with the task with the task of proving that it is 
conscious.  At this point two conditions must be noted:
1  M is given the task of proving that it is certainly conscious.  Proofs that M may be 
conscious which depend on additional assumptions, or which fall within particular 
limits of confidence short of full certainty, fall outside the scope of this argument and 
are not relevant to it.
2  “Conscious” in this context, does not necessarily mean “awake” or “self-
conscious”.  It means only that some form of conscious experience is present, even if 
this is some altered state of consciousness such as a lucid dream.  (It may seem odd to
attribute such states to machines, but as it is impossible to assert, a priori, what forms 
consciousness may take in computing machines, this possibility must be allowed for.)
At this point the reader should be careful to attend to the following operational 
definitions.  Firstly we operationally define certainty as follows:  M is certain of some
proposition k if M is able to determine that k is certainly true.  Other definitions of 
certainty -- for example, subjective “feelings” of being certain -- are not relevant to 
this argument.  Secondly we operationally define provable, in statements of the form 
“proposition k is provable by M” as meaning: M is able to determine that k is 
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certainly true.  The reader should be careful not to confuse this operational definition 
with more familiar notions, for example those concerning the proof of theorems in 
formal systems.  
M’s task can now be represented as a function or mapping from a domain E to a range
X.  E is a binary variable which represents the presence or absence of conscious 
experience and takes the following values:
     E = 1  if conscious experience is present when the mapping is performed;
     E = 0  if no conscious experience is present.
X is a binary variable which takes the following values:
     X = YES  if E = 1
     X = NO  if  E = 0 or if the state of E cannot be ascertained.  
The mapping therefore associates a state E, which represents the presence or absence 
of consciousness, with a state X which represents the answer to the question “Am I 
conscious?”  This mapping is performed by a computation P which can be represented
as follows:
     X = P(E)
where X and E can now be thought of as states (or sets of states) in M.  It is necessary 
also to make the following assumptions:
1  M can reason deductively (in particular, M must have deductive reasoning powers 
equivalent to those of a human being).  It is not necessary to specify exactly what 
these powers are; merely that there is an equivalence between humans and M.
2  M is “honest” -- that is, there are no systematic biases which prevent M from 
reasoning deductively in the domain in question.  This is actually quite a difficult 
requirement to make precise.  The best approach is to assert that there are no 
systematic biases which would make it impossible, even in principle, for M to follow 
classical rules of inference such as modus ponens.  
We now define the following deductive argument which I shall call A:
The reliability and accuracy of the computational process X = P(E) depend critically 
on the reliability and accuracy of P  (which is to say, how well P performs the 
mapping from E on to X).  Consider some malformed computation BadP such that
     X = BadP(E = 0) = YES
In such a case, M will conclude that it is conscious, but M’s conclusion will be neither
accurate nor reliable.  Therefore the accuracy of P needs to be checked, and by 
Principle F, this must be done by some computation P', such that
3
     X' = P'(P) 
where X' is YES if P is found to be accurate and NO otherwise.  But what of the 
reliability and accuracy of P'?  Clearly this would necessitate some further 
computation P'' to establish the accuracy of P' -- and so on leading to an infinite 
regress.  It follows that the reliability and accuracy of P can never be ascertained with 
certainty, and hence the value of E cannot be ascertained with certainty either.  (One 
can paraphrase this by saying that, in any system which relies entirely on 
computations, the reliability and accuracy of any given computation can only be 
determined by applying another computation to it, and this process is obviously non-
terminating.)  It should be noted here that this argument applies even if P = P' (that is, 
if P and P' are the same process) since it does not follow that X = X'.  (As the input is 
different, the output can be different even if the function is the same.)
It follows from this that X cannot be guaranteed to be reliable indicator of the value of
E, and nor can the value of any subsequent state, such as X', render X ultimately 
reliable as an indicator of the value of E.  In plain language this means that X, which 
represents M’s answer to the question “Am I conscious?”, can never be relied upon to 
be a certainly correct answer to that question, so long as the value of X is determined 
by some computation.  It is not possible, by means of any computation, to establish 
with certainty the value of E, and since M is a computing machine, M can never 
establish with certainty that it is conscious.  This concludes the definition of 
Argument A.
It follows from Assumptions 1 and 2 that M can deduce A, and thereby deduce that it 
can never be certain if it is conscious.  This rules out the possibility that M could be 
conscious, and arrive at the correct conclusion that it is conscious via faulty 
reasoning.  Given our assumptions, it is simply impossible for M to be certain that it is
conscious.  It is important to note the two stages of this process.  Argument A simply  
implies the potential unreliability of M (M may be accurate but it is impossible to 
establish this with certainty by means of any computation).  Assumptions 1 and 2 
allow M to deduce A and thus deduce the uncertainty of M (M can show that it can 
never be certain of the accuracy of any of its computations).  (Incidentally it is not 
necessary for M to assume that it is a computing machine; it is sufficient for M to be 
unable to establish with certainty that it is not a computing machine.)  This argument 
has a recursive character which may seem a little baffling at first sight, since the 
reader’s brain is itself part of the argument!  That is, we rely on the reader to 
appreciate the soundness of the deductive argument A.  Once this is given, then 
Assumption 1 guarantees that M will also appreciate the soundness of A.  
It is now apparent that M cannot possess self-certainty.  But conscious human beings 
do possess self-certainty; it is possible for a conscious human being to know, with 
absolute certainty, that they are conscious (in the sense defined above in Condition 2).
This implies that Principle F (which asserts that human beings are computing 
machines of the same form as M) must be wrong.  It is in this sense that we can say 
that consciousness is not a computational property -- or that if it is, it is attended by 
some other property or properties which are not themselves computational in nature.  
At this point it should be remembered that this proof applies only if M possesses 
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deductive powers similar to those of a human being (Assumption 1).  Conceivably if 
M did not possess such powers, then M could not deduce the argument A, and the 
proof of M’s uncertainty would not apply; however in such a case, human beings 
could not be machines of the same form as M.  
Expansion of the computational argument to physical processes 
In the previous section P was considered to be a computation mapping E on to X.  
However there is no reason to confine the definition of P in this way.  P can instead be
regarded as any physical process which performs the same mapping, and M can be 
regarded as a physical system rather than specifically a computing machine.  To 
eliminate any confusion between mappings, computations, and physical processes, the
relation between P and X can be rewritten to avoid any explicit mention of E:
    
     X = O(P)
X is a binary variable as before, but P is now a physical process whose output O 
determines the value of X, where X is some state (or set of states) in a physical 
system.  This formulation is intended to make it clear that physical processes which 
perform functions or mappings may not in any sense “look like” computations; in 
other words, they may not take the form of operations on data inputs.  Once again, the
reader may worry that the term “physical process” is effectively undefined.  A 
physical process can therefore be operationally defined as any objective entity in the 
real world which has the potential to evolve in time.  This includes for example 
collections of molecules, or computers running programs, but excludes abstract 
entities such as mathematical functions, or programs without implementations to run 
them.  The output O of a physical  process can be regarded as just the effect which 
that process has on the value of X.  A physical system can be regarded as some set of 
physical processes.
It is now also necessary to change the Principle F to the following Principle F' (the 
physicalist principle):
“All human mental processes supervene on some physical process.”
Argument A then proceeds much as before, except that the word “computation” in A 
is replaced by the word “process”.  Again one notes the possibility of physical 
processes BadP such that:
     X = O(BadP) = YES
even when E = 0.  This necessitates some physical process P' to ascertain the accuracy
and reliability of P, and as before, this leads to an infinite regress.
This is all that is needed to show that, either consciousness is not a physical property, 
or it is attended by a property or properties which cannot themselves be physical.  As 
before, Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that M can deduce the Argument A, and thereby 
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establish that it can never be certain of being conscious.  The upshot is that any 
physical system capable of reasoning honestly and which has deductive reasoning 
powers equivalent to those of a human being, would have to conclude that the 
question “Am I certainly conscious?” is effectively undecidable.  Consciousness, 
therefore, is not a physically provable property.
How can this be?   It is an inevitable consequence of the separation between the state 
of X and the process P by which the state of X is determined.  This is analogous to 
Caplain’s  principle of cognitive separation.  But it can readily be seen that it applies 
to any process P such that X is the output of P.  In fact, even the qualifier “physical” is
redundant; this argument applies to any sort of process whatsoever if the state of X is 
determined by the output of that process, rather than directly by E with no intervening
process of any sort.2  
The reader may feel that this limitation on the capabilities of physical systems is too 
trivial to be worth mentioning.  It simply means that humans beings derive their 
certainty of being conscious not by any sort of mediating process, but by what in 
philosophy is called “acquaintance”.  However it has a serious consequence which has
received virtually no attention within the academic literature.  Principle F' implies that
if M cannot be certain that it is conscious, then human beings cannot be certain that 
they are conscious either.  Principle F' is therefore inconsistent with the property of 
self-certainty.3    So -- either Principle F' is wrong, or one of the other assumptions 
does not apply to human beings.
It can be noted immediately that Assumption 1 cannot be discarded since by definition
it must apply to human beings.  Assumption 2 could be discarded but would leave one
with the somewhat paradoxical situation that humans could be certain of being 
conscious only because their brains were incapable of honest reasoning (and hence 
were unreliable).  Nonetheless, as we shall see later, there may be situations in which 
Assumption 2 could at least be modified, though to discard it entirely would be asking
rather a lot of coincidence; it would in effect require a faulty system to produce, and 
produce reliably, the correct result via a series of fortuitous accidents. There could 
also be no way for humans to establish with certainty that the flaw in their reasoning 
was precisely that flaw required, for them to reach the correct answer to the question 
“Am I conscious?”  This seems to leave one with no choice but to throw out Principle 
F'.  Human mental processes, in other words, do not all supervene on physical 
processes.4
2
In fact it is not enough for E directly to determine X; E must also directly determine that it is the case 
that E directly determines X, and do so in a way that a conscious subject can be certain is reliable -- 
that is, not by means of any physical process which would be susceptible to Argument A.
3
Another way of looking at this is to say that knowledge or understanding by “acquaintance” is 
impossible in any physical system; or that if it is possible, it cannot influence the evolution of that 
system.
4One might think that allowing X to be identical with E might solve this problem -- that is, by allowing 
X to be a state which is identical with consciousness itself.  It is obviously possible to arrange things so
that if E and X are identical, then it must be the case that E = 1 if  X = YES.  But to make use of this 
(and thus to be certain that X can be relied on)  M must have some way of being certain that it is the 
case that E and X are identical.  Since M is a physical system, any means of obtaining such a proof 
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It is important to note that this conclusion applies not only to consciousness itself, but 
to some of the contents of consciousness as well.  It also follows from Argument A 
that if human beings were exclusively physical systems, they could not be certain of 
the truth of the statement “I am reading this article”; indeed they could not even be 
certain of the truth of the statement “I believe I am reading this article”.  One could 
even formulate Argument A in such a way that physical systems could not be certain 
of their own existence.  
There is also an important difference between this conclusion concerning 
consciousness in physical systems, and the original, more restricted conclusion 
regarding computing machines.  This is because even if human beings can be certain 
that they have conscious experience, it is still the case that physical systems -- such as
brains -- cannot.  This implies that when human beings ask themselves if they are 
conscious, either the evolution of their mental processes will diverge from the 
physical evolution of their brain-states in some drastic and irreversible manner; or 
their mental processes will force their brains to evolve in a manner which is 
inconsistent with their own physically determined behavior.  Such a violation of 
physically determined behavior should entail -- at the very least -- a violation of the 
principle of conservation of energy.  Such a violation we shall henceforth refer to by 
the symbol c (from chramoV,  a cleft or gap).  The point of interest here is that c 
should be empirically detectable.  When human beings are asked to consider 
Argument A, and then decide if they are conscious, then -- assuming all human beings
are conscious, and know it -- c should be detectable within their brains.
    
Single-mind Q may partially conceal c
I hope to examine the problems associated with the detection of c in future work. 
However it is first necessary to examine a possibility which may make c intrinsically 
undetectable, at least under certain conditions.  This section will require a small 
diversion into quantum mechanics.  In the most common interpretation of quantum 
mechanics (the Copenhagen interpretation) the physical state of a quantum system is 
represented by a vector in Hilbert space (Von Neumann 1955).  This state evolves 
deterministically according to the unitary dynamics of quantum mechanics (Barrett 
1999).  Measurements are represented by applying an appropriate operator (in the 
form of a Hermitian matrix) to the state vector, which produces a representation of the
state vector in terms of some particular measurement basis.  The physical states 
represented by the measurement basis are called eigenstates, since these are the states 
which result when the state vector is an eigenvector of the corresponding operator.  
Normally, however, the state vector will be a superposition of basis states, and on 
measurement this vector is assumed to “project” non-deterministically to an eigenstate
of the measurement basis.  This is the well-known “collapse” or “reduction” of the 
state vector.
The problem is that quantum mechanical theory does not provide any clear 
explanation of what constitutes a measurement.  In order to circumvent this difficulty, 
must supervene on some physical process, whereupon Argument A proceeds as before.
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attention has focused recently on so-called “no-collapse” interpretations, in which the 
physical state never collapses and superpositions persist indefinitely (see Barrett, 
1999 for a review).  However this now presents us with another problem;  how to 
account for the determinate nature of our experiences, which are always of single 
“classical” properties and never of superpositions of states.  One approach to dealing 
with this is the single mind Q interpretation (Barrett 1999)5.  Single mind Q assumes 
some particular property Q, which evolves in such a way as to ensure that all our 
experiences are determinate.  But in this approach, Q is regarded as a purely mental 
property -- single mind Q, in other words, postulates a robust mind-body dualism.  Q 
also functions to orchestrate or co-ordinate the experiences of different minds; 
without this, different minds would experience completely different and potentially 
unconnected realities.
The consequences of this for detecting c are as follows.  The process of 
neuroscientific inquiry can be regarded as the partitioning of a set U, which contains 
every possible neural topography.  Each element of U -- that is, each neural 
topography -- is a fully specified set of neurological properties (or as fully specified as
quantum indeterminacy will allow).  The term “neurological properties” is here 
intended to refer to all brain properties, and not necessarily just positional ones.  The 
partitioning of U will yield a subset which I shall call N.  As neuroscientific inquiry 
advances, the set N would be expected to get smaller and smaller.6
However in a no-collapse theory, the physical state of the brain underlying U is 
assumed always to be a quantum state.   It is important to be clear about what is going
on here. The elements of U are not themselves quantum states.  In fact in single mind 
Q, they are not really physical states at all.  They are best understood as classical 
appearances; that is, they are descriptions of how neural topographies appear to the 
neuroscientists who are observing them.  They are purely mental properties.  (The 
determinate nature of these experiences is guaranteed by the determinate property Q, 
which is a property of the combined system of observer plus brain being studied.)
There are two ways in which U can be partitioned.  First, as the physical system 
evolves, correlations will develop both between neurological properties and other 
neurological properties, and between neurological properties and properties in the 
environment.  As this evolution occurs some elements of U will become inconsistent 
5Single mind Q is in fact just one example of a type of theory called a "Q theory".  In other versions of 
Q theory, Q is regarded simply as a physical parameter.  In these versions of Q theory mind-body 
dualism is obviously not required.
6The technically-minded reader will have noticed that this is somewhat oversimplified.  Although the 
classical requirement that neuroscientific inquiry is possible ensures that the subset N will reduce in 
size over time, quantum indeterminacy means that it will not do so smoothly; individual elements of U 
will “jump” in and out of N as N is refined.  The reason for this apparent anomaly is that, in order to 
keep the representation simple, I have deliberately ignored the difference between static topographies --
those defined at some precise instant of time -- and dynamic topographies, which evolve over time.  
Neuroscientists who aim to understand the brain are typically interested in dynamic topographies.  If 
one assumes that quantum mechanics plays no functional role in neural processing, then the dynamic 
topographies can be considered as evolving in essentially classical ways.  In this case the quantum 
indeterminacy in the static topographies can be considered as noise and disregarded.  From a 
neuroscientist‘s perspective, the physical state can therefore be regarded as a set of classical 
topographies which is subsequently partitioned by measurement.
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with the physical state.  One can say that these elements are partitioned out of U, and 
not included in N.  The second way U can be partitioned is via the process of quantum
measurement; that is, the selection of an eigenstate for some observable.  Since in 
single mind Q this sort of partitioning is always a mental process, the physical state 
remains unchanged after each partition.  However the net effect of both types of 
process is to produce a subset N which is smaller than it was before.
There is here a potential loophole by which the effect c might be partially concealed.  
Consider how the brain is normally thought to function; it is a physical system which 
instantiates what might be called intelligent processes.  These are processes which 
enable the brain to respond to a wide range of environmental stimuli without requiring
a separate programmed behavior for each stimulus.  (Assumptions 1 and 2 may be 
regarded as an operational definition for such intelligent processes in human beings.)  
The understanding of these processes is the business of the so-called “special” 
sciences, such as psychology and cognitive neuroscience.  Intelligent processes are 
assumed to supervene on the physical processes which instantiate them.
Now consider the following thought experiment.  Imagine an enormously powerful 
oracle, which is able to give accurate and meaningful answers to every question asked
of it.  Such an oracle would appear omniscient to all those by whom it was 
questioned.  But consider that the actual number of questions such an oracle is likely 
to be asked in a finite period of time is probably a very small fraction of the number 
of questions which could be asked.  If it were possible for the oracle to know in 
advance which questions would be asked, then the oracle could perhaps contrive to 
know the answers to just those questions and not trouble itself about those questions 
which no-one would ask.  The oracle would still appear omniscient to all those who 
questioned it; but in practice it would be no such thing.
An analogous situation potentially exists in the relationship between intelligent 
processes and the physical processes which instantiate them.  Of course no-one 
believes that intelligent processes are all-powerful, but they are very likely far more 
powerful then is needed to deal with the whole range of situations which arise within 
a given human lifetime.  That is, intelligent processes are capable of dealing with 
many situations that never in fact arise.  This is assumed to be necessary because no-
one can predict what situations will actually arise within a human lifetime, even 
though most of them will never occur.  But what if the actual state of the brain were 
indeterminate at the moment each novel environmental situation arose?  In that case 
the conscious experience of each new environmental stimulus could be regarded as a 
further partitioning of N.   If the actual state of the brain were indeterminate then the 
resulting partition would contain all neural topographies consistent with the correct 
response to that stimulus (except those which had previously been partitioned out of 
N).  In most cases this would include all topographies which fully instantiated 
intelligent processes, but would also include many topographies in which intelligent 
processes were only partially instantiated (because these topographies would not yet 
have been partitioned out by measurement).
In the previous section it was shown that any physical system which fully instantiates 
the human capacity for deductive reasoning will be unable to conclude with certainty 
that it is conscious (or indeed that it has any other property).  But this does not 
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necessarily apply to systems which only partially instantiate human deductive 
reasoning.  How does this work in practice?  Successive neurological observations 
and conscious experiences will partition the set U and Q will evolve to ensure the 
partition is determinate.  But quantum measurement will partition U in such a way as 
to select precisely those topographies which are consistent with those observations 
and experiences, as long as such states are available -- that is, as long as topographies 
which are consistent with those observations and experiences remain in N.  For 
example, consider a neural topography which contains a population of cells whose 
only purpose is to force M to answer “yes” whenever the question “Am I conscious?” 
is asked.   The previous section showed that such a topography could not be consistent
with intelligent processes which incorporate a capacity for honest deductive 
reasoning.  But so long as such topographies remain within N, then quantum 
measurement will select precisely those topographies, and these topographies could 
be observed through neurological research.   Indeed those topographies which did 
fully instantiate intelligent processes would be inconsistent with the conscious 
experience of self-certainty, and would therefore be selected out by the partition and 
hence not included in N.  So the price one pays for consistency between conscious 
states and physical states is a lack of consistency between the selected topographies 
and the intelligent processes which supposedly supervene on them.  One can see that 
in such a case the effect c would not occur.
Of course in practice it is not just the particular sample of environmental situations 
which occur within a given human lifetime which one has to consider, but the sample 
of such situations which occur throughout the whole of human evolutionary history.  
As the range of actual environmental situations encountered by human beings 
throughout history becomes larger and larger, the permissible deviation of the 
topographies in N from perfect consistency with intelligent processes becomes 
smaller and smaller -- just as, in the case of the oracle, as the number of questions 
actually asked of the oracle gets ever larger, the oracle will have to get ever closer to 
true omniscience.
There are two potential difficulties with using single mind Q to “conceal” the effect c.
Firstly, mental operations such as deciding that one is conscious are not really like 
measurements of quantum observables. In the measurement of a quantum observable 
an eigenstate of that observable is selected randomly, in accordance with the quantum 
amplitudes associated with the various eigenstates.  But in the specific example of 
deciding that one is conscious, only those neural states which are consistent with the 
outcome of that process are possible.  Correlation of the observer’s physical state with
the observer’s own mental state removes any possibility of quantum indeterminacy in 
this particular case.
Since clearly we must be correlated with our own brains this presents no problem for 
us.  But consider an extraterrestrial visitor who is not correlated with our brain states 
or our mental states.  Such a visitor would find it extremely peculiar that the usual 
rules of quantum indeterminacy were being flouted.   One can see why by considering
the example above of a population of cells whose sole purpose is to ensure that we 
always answer “yes” whenever the question “Am I conscious?” is asked.  Such a 
neural topography, and the evolutionary history leading up to it, would be extremely 
unusual.  An extraterrestrial visitor uncorrelated with our mental and brain states 
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would expect to find many examples elsewhere in the universe of conscious beings 
whose brains did not exhibit such a topography.  We would thus be unusual in being 
perhaps the only conscious beings in the universe who could be certain of being 
conscious, a circumstance which appears unreasonable.
One way round this problem would be to require that all intelligences in the universe, 
including all extraterrestrial intelligences, were in fact correlated with our own mental
and brain states in some fundamental way.  The source of such a correlation would 
presumably have to be found in the very early history of the universe.  Another way 
would be to impose a requirement that the “minds” in single mind Q entail certain 
properties, and to require that the neural topographies they select be fully consistent 
with intelligent processes.  In this second case the rules of quantum indeterminacy 
could be preserved, and c would not be concealed and should be detectable.
The second problem is that single-mind Q in any case would not completely eliminate 
the possibility of c.  Consider a comprehensive program of neuroscientific research, 
as represented by a long sequence of measurements, completed before any attempt 
was made to detect c.  The result would be a subset V, which would be the 
intersection of all those subsets of U selected by their respective measurements.  If the
research program were intensive enough then V might be a very small subset indeed.  
In such a case, one could not be sure that V would still contain sufficient neural 
topographies, that at least one would remain which was consistent with the mental 
property of knowing that one is conscious.  All neural topographies consistent with 
that outcome might have been partitioned out by the previous sequence of 
measurements.  In such a case one would expect c to be detectable subsequently.
Note that the subset V can be defined as follows:
     V = U \ (Vn È Ve È  W)
where Vn is the subset of U inconsistent with neuroscientific observations; Ve is the 
subset of U inconsistent with observed environmental properties; and W is the subset 
of U inconsistent with the existence of the non-physical “minds” required by single 
mind Q.  The considerations in this section can be summarized by saying that, if the 
correct quantum statistics are to be maintained, then either all “minds” in the universe 
are correlated, or “minds” which are certain of their existence are found only on earth,
or it is the case that the subset W is not empty.
Single mind Q may explain a specific operational definition of free will
There is a sense in which the single mind Q approach to quantum mechanics may 
explain a certain notion of free will.   To see how this is so, we must now refer to 
some celebrated experiments by the physiologist Benjamin Libet.  The first 
experiments of interest here refer to a phenomenon generally known as the readiness 
potential (Libet, Gleason, Wright and Pearl 1983; Libet 1985).  When human subjects 
are asked to time as accurately as possible when they experience the impulse to 
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perform a random movement, an EEG trace is observable up to 0.3 seconds before the
subject’s first conscious awareness of the impulse (this number is an average 
computed from aggregate data).  This is known as the readiness potential.  It might be 
argued that, since the EEG trace precedes the conscious impulse and in effect predicts 
it, the apparently random conscious impulse is not, in fact, random at all but 
determined by the neurophysiological state of the subject’s brain.  So, to the extent 
that one regards random impulses as a matter of free will, Libet’s results can be taken 
as an argument against free will.
Libet’s interpretation of these findings is controversial, particularly with respect to the
readiness potential; and it is not my intention here to attempt to resolve this 
controversy.  I wish to make the much narrower point, that even if the readiness 
potential can be regarded as a predictor of the subject’s decision in a classical system, 
it cannot necessarily be regarded as such in a quantum system.  The reason is that the 
neurological properties underlying the readiness potential may not actually have 
determinate values until the subject becomes consciously aware of their decision.  In 
connection with this, an earlier experiment (Libet, Alberts, Wright and Feinstein 
1972) is of interest here.  Using a technique known as backward masking which, for 
reasons of space, will not be described here, Libet found evidence that perceptual 
stimuli can take up to 0.5 seconds (with a minimum of 0.4 seconds) before they 
register as conscious impressions -- it takes that long for the subject’s brain to process 
them.  This delay is called perceptual latency.  
Single mind Q illustrates how the second effect may counteract the first. Consider an 
EEG machine which is in a superposition of two states; a state EEGON, in which the 
readiness potential is detected, and a state EEGOFF in which no readiness potential is 
detected.  These states are correlated with brain states BRAINON and BRAINOFF, in 
which the readiness potential occurs and does not occur respectively.  From the 
perceptual latency effect described above, it will take roughly 0.5 seconds for the 
states EEGON and EEGOFF to form a conscious impression in the mind of the observer 
reading the EEG machine-- at which point, according to single mind Q, the 
superposition will be resolved to a single determinate state (albeit only in the minds of
the conscious observers).   But by that time, the subject’s conscious awareness will 
already have selected a determinate value for the readiness potential, since the 
readiness potential is shorter than the perceptual latency.
In other words, it is impossible for any observer to perceive consciously if a readiness 
potential has in fact occurred, before the experimental subject experiences the 
conscious impression of a random impulse.  Since in single mind Q determinate 
properties are mental properties, this means there simply is no determinate state for 
the readiness potential or the EEG trace before the subject becomes aware of their 
conscious decision.  The readiness potential therefore cannot, even in principle, be 
used to predict the subject’s decision before it happens.  This will always be the case 
if the perceptual latency is longer than the readiness potential.  And so, according to 
single mind Q, it will be the subject who determines the state BRAINON or BRAINOFF, 
and hence the state EEGON or EEGOFF, by random selection.  This state of affairs is 
empirically indistinguishable from the operational definition of free will posited by 
Libet, but removes any possibility that the readiness potential can be said to have a 
determinate value before the subject’s conscious decision.  Of course, this only 
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applies to the rather limited sense of free will described by Libet.  It is also subject to 
empirical review should subsequent research challenge the relative values of the 
readiness potential and perceptual latency.
What sort of neural mechanism might be implied by the effect described here?  A 
neural network which exploits single mind Q might have the following properties: P is
a population of cells, and I1 and I2 are, respectively, excitatory and inhibitory inputs to
P.  X is a population of cells I shall call the state determiner -- Population X 
determines the output of the network.  E and Y are populations which are connected to
X by reciprocal excitatory and reciprocal inhibitory connections respectively.  X is 
connected to P by a delay line, which allows small changes in P to manifest before 
they are amplified by the connections from X to E and Y.  K(P) is the mean activity 
level7 of P the value of which is equal to Kidle when I1 = I2.  The network is set so that 
when the activity level of X is Kidle, both E and Y are inactive.  An increase in the 
activity level K(X) of X will drive K(X) to a level Kmax, and a decrease will drive 
K(X) to Kmin, which are respectively the maximum and minimum values of K(X).
We now introduce a quantum noise term8 e to P.  (It is important to note that merely 
adding classical noise to the network will not work, since the effect being exploited 
here relies on the quantum superposition being maintained until a conscious decision 
is made.)  We assume e to be approximately Gaussian in distribution, with a mean of 
zero.  Therefore when I1 = I2, the activity level of P will be:
     K(P) = Kidle + e
The effect of this is to introduce a small variation in K(P) which will quickly be 
amplified by the network so that the state determiner X will evolve to either Kmax or 
Kmin.  In quantum mechanical terms, the state vector of the network can be represented
as a superposition of two states: a state MAX in which K(P) = Kmax,  and a state MIN 
in which K(P) =  Kmin.  According to single mind Q, a single state, either MAX or 
MIN, will then be selected randomly once a conscious observation is made.  
(Different probabilities for Kmax and Kmin can be arranged by varying I1 and I2 so that 
K(P) is initially either slightly greater or slightly less than Kidle).  
   
Consciousness as a fundamental entity in explanations of nature
Finally I want to make a brief remark about how theories of consciousness, and its 
7
Each cell in P, X, E and Y fires a number of action potentials within a certain time Dt.  This number is 
assumed to follow a Poisson distribution with mean mK.  Excitatory or inhibitory inputs are assumed to 
increase or decrease the value of mK.
8The most likely source of such noise is thought to be in the random variation of neurotransmitter 
release at neural synapses (Destexhe 2012).  If these small random variations are considered equally 
likely to increase or decrease the likelihood that a cell will fire an action potential, then the cumulative 
effect of many such variations can be regarded as Gaussian distributed with a mean of zero, if the 
number of effects is sufficiently large.  It is unfortunately impossible to quantify these effects in any 
simple way since they depend critically on the internal connectivity of the network, and in particular on
the extent of feedback connections within the populations of cells.
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interaction with the physical world, should include consciousness itself as an entity.  
Since consciousness cannot be fully decomposed into physical components, how can 
it be defined as a theoretical entity, and what properties should be attributed to it?  The
obvious starting point is to define consciousness in terms of precisely that property 
which turns out to be 
inconsistent with physical decomposition -- that is to say, self-certainty.  This property
can be defined in terms of the mapping E ® X which was set out in the first section 
of this article.  If we refer to this mapping as the function p0, then self-certainty can be
defined as the capacity of consciousness to perform the function p0 with provable 
reliability and accuracy.  This can be defined symbolically in terms of an infinite 
sequence of functions:
      p1, p2, p3, …
where every pn can be defined in the following terms:
      Xn = pn(pn-1)
such that:
      Xn = YES if pn-1 is performed accurately and reliably;
      Xn = NO otherwise.
Clearly, each function pn in the sequence examines whether the previous function pn-1 
has been correctly performed.  These functions obviously correspond to the 
computations (or physical processes) described as part of the infinite regress in 
Argument A.  However, unlike those processes, these functions are merely abstract 
representations of the properties of consciousness, and are not concrete entities in the 
physical world.  In fact the representation of self-certainty in terms of a sequence of 
functions provides another way of proving the impossibility of self-certainty in a 
purely physical system, since it is easy to show that no physical system can perform 
all of these functions.  To see why, one need only assume some physical process Pn 
which performs each function pn. If one assumes the functions are performed 
sequentially, then one notes that each Pn requires some time to execute, say dt.  The 
infinite sequence of functions therefore requires a total time of dt multiplied by 
infinity.  Alternatively if one assumes the various functions are performed in parallel, 
then each Pn requires some region of space, say dV, to execute.  The total volume of 
space required to perform all the functions simultaneously is therefore dV multiplied 
by infinity.  A physical system to perform the infinite sequence of functions would 
therefore need either to be infinitely large or to take an infinite amount of time, and 
neither contingency is physically reasonable.
The infinite sequence of functions can be summarized as a single function pw, 
identified by the subscript w or omega:
     Xw = pw(E)
where:
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     Xw = YES if it is provably the case both that E = 1 and pw is reliably performed;
     Xw = NO (or more accurately, is undefined) otherwise.
This is purely a notational convenience.  One can regard a defining characteristic of 
consciousness as the ability to perform the function pw, and a defining physical 
property of consciousness as the c effect (or violation of energy conservation) which 
is associated with it.  Once defined, such a fundamental entity can be included in 
theoretical models, or simulations, of neurological or cognitive processes.  This 
illustrates that it is not true, as is sometimes claimed, that allowing a non-physical 
basis for consciousness renders it immune to analysis or understanding.
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